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Drawing on Deleuze’s ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, our initial focus in this 
article will be on the role of institutions within societies of control, an analysis 
which brings Deleuze into the orbit of Ervin Goffman’s famous ethnographic work 
on total institutions. This cross-comparative analysis of Deleuze and Goffman 
(also montaged with Foucault’s important work on disciplinary institutions) will 
allow us to show how institutions of control function by sequencing dividuals across 
institutional domains in a continual process of totalization. Inspired by James 
Williams’s recent work on the ‘process philosophy of signs’, we then argue that a 
critique of totalizing institutions can be positively articulated as a process oriented 
challenge to algorithmic technologies and as a counter-sequencing of institutional 
control.  We conclude with some reflections upon the emergent modes of resistance 
that challenge both institutional and technological control and we will proffer 
criteria for assessing such practices in relation to the two-sided nature of critique 
they enact, both processual and counter-sequential. 
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As Michael Hardt notes, it is clear that Deleuze’s (1995) famous ‘Postscript on 
Control Societies’ says ‘very little about the society of control’ (Hardt, 1998, p. 
139). Taking up the challenge of developing Deleuze’s elliptical remarks, Hardt 
frames his task in two ways: in relation to the ‘withering of civil society’ and ‘the 
passage from imperialism…to Empire, today’s world order’ (Hardt, 1998, p. 138). 
More recently, others looking to fill in Deleuze’s sketch of control society have 
taken a different path. Inspired by the rise of social media and the use of 
increasingly sophisticated forms of computation at all levels of politics, economics 
and society they have focused on the technological developments that enable 
control to function evermore smoothly and pervasively: a new age of ‘total 
planetary computation’? (Greenfield 2018; Bratton, 2016; Galloway, 2016; 
Rouvroy, 2012) Both approaches have contributed greatly to our understanding 
of control societies, at the global and the technological levels. That said, there 
remains a problem. For Deleuze, the emergence of control society is a process that 
begins with the crisis of disciplinary institutions. Indeed, Hardt puts it well when 
he notes: ‘the walls of the institutions are breaking down in such a way that their 
disciplinary logics do not become ineffective but are rather generalized in fluid 
forms across the social field’ (Hardt, 1998, p. 139). However, there has been no 
sustained interrogation of how exactly these new institutional formations 
function. The walls may be ‘breaking down’ but it is not clear how the institutions 
operate ‘across the social field’ and, therefore, how the rise of new institutional 
forms supports, and is supported by, the technological apparatuses of control. As 
a consequence, attempts to consider the relationship between control, critique 
and resistance have been hampered by an over-emphasis on general global 
dynamics and on technological innovations, at the expense of the insights that can 
be garnered from detailed analyses of the institutions themselves.  
In this article we will provide a framework for these analyses by asking 
three interrelated questions. Firstly, how do the institutions of control societies 
function? Answering this question will require the development of an institutional 
analysis that complements Deleuze’s (1995) brief but provocative 
characterization of societies of control. There are two aspects to developing this 
analysis: a) charting the well-known distinction Deleuze draws between 
disciplinary and control societies (in particular the shift from regimes of 
individuation to those of dividuation) and then, b) introducing a perhaps more 
surprising comparison between societies of control and Goffman’s (1961) 
ethnographic work on total institutions. This latter aspect will allow us to develop 
Hardt’s insight by assessing the shift from disciplinary to control institutions as 
one best described as a breakdown of the total function of the former to the 
totalizing function of the latter. Bringing the two aspects together we will argue 
that institutions of control function by sequencing dividuals across institutional 
domains in a process of totalization. This institutional analysis complements the 
more technologically oriented analyses that Deleuze’s characterization of control 
has engendered (partly as a result of ambiguities in his own discussion, as we will 
see below). Many accounts of control societies tend toward a partial, technological 
analysis of how control functions and this has an important bearing on the other 
two questions we want to pose. 
Second, what is the status of critique in control societies? While the idea of 
critique as a practice of establishing the legitimate limits of knowledge emerged 
within sovereign societies and was then reframed as practices that transgressed 
those limits in disciplinary societies, it is by no means clear what, if any, new 
practice of critique is appropriate for societies of control. Indeed, it has become 
increasingly commonplace to argue that critique is no longer relevant. It is thought 
by some contemporary theorists of a neo-Heideggerian hue to be ‘exhausted’ such 
that it should give way to matters of concern (for example, Latour, 2004; Harman, 
2011) whereas those looking to revive the communist idea argue that critique is 
irretrievably implicated in the sordid game of ‘parliamentarianism’ such that it 
should be replaced by a reinvigorated sense of political commitment (for example, 
Badiou and Žižek, 2009). On the contrary, we will argue that a critique of control 
society from within its own logic of constitution – that is, an immanent critique - 
can be positively articulated both as a process oriented challenge to algorithmic 
technologies and as a counter-sequencing of the totalizing function of institutional 
control. 
The third question we will address is this: does the possibility of a critique 
of control infer modes of resistance to both its institutional and technological 
forms? At the end of his essay on control societies, Deleuze ponders whether or 
not trade unions still have a role in the struggle against disciplines or ‘will they 
give way to new forms of resistance against control societies?’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 
182). He suggests that this is a task ‘for young people’; almost three decades later 
have these people found modes of resistance against the ‘snake’s coils’? We will 
conclude with some reflections upon the emergent modes of resistance that 
challenge both institutional and technological control. Answers to these three 
questions must begin with a close reading of Deleuze’s ‘Postscript’. 
 
Deleuze’s ‘Postscript’ 
Deleuze’s essay is split into three sections: ‘History’, ‘Logic’, and ‘Program’, with 
the middle section afforded the most space. In the ‘History’ section, Deleuze gives 
one of the most succinct and yet instructive accounts available of how Foucault 
understood the emergence of disciplinary societies; how, once established, 
disciplinary institutions function; and, how they were already fading out of 
existence in the aftermath of the Second World War. According to Deleuze, it was 
clear by the beginning of the twentieth century that there had been a 
‘transformation from one kind of society to another’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 178). 
‘Major sites of confinement’ that operate by segmenting individual lives and 
populations into designated roles and functions characterize this new disciplinary 
model of society. This segmentation is most obvious as one moves from one site 
to another: ‘you’re not at home, you know’, ‘you’re not at school, you know’ 
(Deleuze, 1995, p. 177). But, as Deleuze acknowledges, Foucault – the great analyst 
of disciplinary societies – already knew, as he was writing Discipline and Punish, 
that disciplinary institutions were breaking down and new forms of governance 
were taking hold. Deleuze adapts an idea from William Burroughs when he labels 
the emergent post-disciplinary dispositif; control (Deleuze, 1995, p. 178). 
The section titled ‘Logic’ has three component parts; it deals first with the 
nature of institutions and their relation to each other within societies of control; 
it then moves on to a discussion of how this affects individuals at the personal and 
collective levels; before ending with a discussion of the machines that correspond 
to control (all the while sharpening the contrast between discipline and control). 
We will take each in turn. Where disciplinary institutions were characterized by 
‘independent variables’, control societies operate by way of ‘inseparable 
variations’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 178). In a justly famous distinction, he argues that 
disciplinary confinement molded individuals according to roles and functions 
whereas controls are defined by modulations that traverse both the social field and 
the life-course of individuals. He gives two main examples; the shift from factories 
to businesses and the shift from schools as sites of discipline to the idea of 
continuing education as a mode of control. It is worth quoting what he says about 
the latter: 
Even the state education system has been looking at the principle of 
‘getting paid for results’; in fact, just as businesses are replacing 
factories, school is being replaced by continuing education and exams 
by continuous assessment. It is the surest way of turning education into 
a business (Deleuze, 1995, p. 179). 
On the one hand, we can say that this is a prescient remark borne out by the recent 
history of state education at all levels. On the other hand, we might say that 
Deleuze didn’t entirely foresee that the same logic was beginning to turn 
businesses, and other institutions, into education systems. 
Turning to forms of political subjectivity engendered by control, Deleuze 
contrasts the processes of individuation operative within disciplinary institutions 
with those processes of dividuation that signal control. ‘We are no longer dealing 
with a duality of mass and individual’ he says, rather ‘individuals become dividuals 
and masses become samples, data, markets or banks’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 180). 
What is a dividual? A dividual is a bundle of elements held together in variation 
rather than in reference to a unitary subject. Where disciplinary institutions 
segmented the life-course of individuals into separate subjective roles and 
functions, control modulates elements of subjectivity across the entire social field. 
Where disciplinary societies required institutions to normalize behaviour in 
subject positions, control societies optimize dividuated behaviours without norm 
(Tarizzo, 2013). 
How are such processes of dividuation made operative as control? Deleuze 
turns to the machines that correspond to this form of society – information 
technologies and computers – adding that ‘this technological development is 
deeply rooted in a mutation of capitalism’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 180), moving from 
proprietorial forms of production to ‘metaproduction’ such that ‘marketing is now 
the instrument of social control’ that ‘produces the arrogant breed who are our 
masters’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 181). Although Deleuze is clear that this 
correspondence should not be taken to indicate any hint of a technological 
determinist reading of the base-superstructure relation (Deleuze, 1995, p. 180), it 
is evident that this section places an emphasis upon the technological forms 
through which control functions, a feature that is then further cemented in the last 
section. 
The last section, ‘Program’, has a dual function that plays on two senses of 
the word. It begins with a summary remark regarding the ways in which 
contemporary societies embed programmable mechanisms of control within 
information and computational technologies. But it also contains the seeds of a 
(political or revolutionary) program to challenge control. In relation to the former, 
Deleuze returns to the brief examples of how disciplinary institutions are breaking 
down and being supplanted by mechanisms of control located in the continual 
modulation of dividuals. In relation to the latter, he says that we must find both 
‘the basic socio-technological principles of control mechanisms as their age 
dawns’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 182) and in so doing see if we can glimpse the outlines 
of future forms of resistance to control.  
However, by now we may sense a slight but important shift in Deleuze’s 
account. While the Postscript begins with claims about the general breakdown of 
disciplinary institutions and their transformation into new institutions of control 
there is, by the end of the essay, a tendency to discuss the transition from 
discipline to control as one that leaves institutions behind altogether, in favour of 
technological expressions of this newly emergent society. Perhaps it is 
unsurprising, therefore, that much of the work that has drawn inspiration from 
this essay has focused on the technological aspects of control societies rather than 
on its institutional features. Galloway provides a striking case in point: ‘the society 
of control is characterized not by the power of the institutions of modernity, or 
pre-modernity, the army, the prison, the university, the church, but instead by 
what he [Deleuze] called the ultra-rapid forms of free-floating control that are 
inherent in distributed networks’ (Galloway, 2006, pp. 318-9). Despite the 
slippage in Deleuze’s presentation, however, and the attendant focus within the 
secondary commentary on his essay on technological forms of control, we suggest 
that it remains crucial to understand the transition from discipline to control as a 
process in which the institutions are transformed, rather than treating it as the 
emergence of a de-institutionalized social formation. The aim is not to criticize 
technological accounts of control – in fact, they are becoming especially pertinent 
as the everyday lifeworld we inhabit is increasingly governed by computational or 
algorithmic logics – but to complement those analyses with an awareness of the 
how institutions function in control societies. That said, we shall argue that 
focusing only on technological advances as indicators of control does jeopardize 
the practical element of Deleuze’s ‘Program’: what are we to do in relation to the 
emergence of these new forms of governance, if we want to critique them and then 
to resist?  This leads us to consider the following question: what is the role of 
institutions in control societies? 
 
Institutions of Control 
While it is now widely understood that disciplinary institutions segment 
individuals and populations into a series of independent subject positions, control 
institutions function by separating the components of individuality in ways that 
tend toward the dispersal of these dividuals across the whole social field, often in 
conflictual and contradictory ways. The population in control societies is no 
longer a mass (of individuals) but a trajectory of dividuation tending toward total 
absorption with the technological mechanisms of control. In this sense, the 
institutions of control serve to totalize the dividuated elements of previously 
disciplined subjects without harmonizing these in any one subject position at any 
given time or across a life-course thereby aiding in their technological dispersion 
through the machines that correspond to control.  
As it stands, though, this is merely a slight corrective to a tendency within 
Deleuze’s essay in which he shifts subtly from a claim about the transformation of 
institutions to one about the breakdown and implied disappearance of 
institutions. However, we can give it more nuance if we explore the ways in which 
the totalizing institutions of control societies can be compared to the total 
institutions analyzed by Goffman. 
When Goffman published his essay ‘On the Characteristics of Total 
Institutions’ we might say that the owl of Minerva was indeed taking flight and 
social theorists were able to grasp the significance of Victorian institutional 
formations as they were beginning to fade. Nonetheless, and as Deleuze insists in 
regard to Foucault’s account of disciplinary institutions, they continue to hold 
sway in many respects (just as there are many elements of sovereign societies that 
still pervade institutional life) and in their gradual transformation we can see not 
only how these institutions have shaped the past but also what may be emerging 
as new institutions in the present. Goffman’s idea of the total institution is useful 
in this regard, in two respects: firstly, by virtue of differentiating total from 
disciplinary and totalizing institutions; second, by virtue of the extent to which he 
anticipated the emergence of totalizing institutions. 
For Goffman, total institutions come in different forms – psychiatric 
institutions, monasteries and army camps, for example – but they all share certain 
basic features oriented by the management of a person’s ‘sleep, play and work’ 
under a single authority. As Goffman puts it, the ‘central feature of total 
institutions can be described as the breakdown of the barriers ordinarily 
separating these three spheres of life’ (sleep, play and work) such that ‘all aspects 
of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority’ 
(Goffman, 1961, p. 17). In a manner reminiscent of Foucault’s account of 
disciplinary institutions, Goffman goes on to detail how all total institutions also 
involve placing people within batches that are ‘treated alike and required to do 
the same thing together’ and that members of a total institution lead regularized 
life governed by schedules, ‘the whole sequence of activities being imposed from 
above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials’ (Goffman, 1961, 
p. 17).  
That said, a further general feature of total institutions begins to show the 
difference with Foucault. For Goffman, total institutions are all oriented by a single 
plan at odds with everyday activity that, in contrast, operates ‘without an overall 
rational plan’ (Goffman, 1961, p. 17). Where Goffman still presumes a division 
between normal civil society and the total institutions that hybridize aspects of 
that normal existence (Goffman, 1961, pp. 17-18), Foucault understands the 
diagrammatic nature and function of disciplinary institutions within all aspects of 
life (Foucault, 1977, pp. 200-209). Both understand the corrective nature of 
institutions but Goffman tends to see this correction as one in which the 
presumption of a correct form of life resides, whereas Foucault grasps that 
correction is the process of norm creation in the first place. In this sense, it is clear 
that Goffman’s total institutions are not Foucault’s disciplinary ones, even though 
there is a sense in which both thinkers are grappling with the fading of these 
institutions in a post-WWII setting. But to what extent is the idea of total 
institution useful in establishing what is happening with the breakdown of 
disciplinary institutions if they are not, after all, the same thing? 
Perhaps paradoxically, while Foucault’s analysis of the diagrammatic 
features of disciplinary institutions avoids a problematic presumption of 
relatively normal ‘civil society’, it does tend toward fixing the logic of discipline 
into the institutional apparatuses in a manner that doesn’t usefully capture the 
dynamism of the transformations at work. Intriguingly, Goffman’s analysis of total 
institutions from the very start presents a fluid conception of how these 
institutions permeate civil society. ‘For example’, he says, ‘our large commercial, 
industrial and educational establishments are increasingly providing cafeterias 
and free-time recreation for their members’ (Goffman, 1961, p. 17). Where he 
remains naive is in thinking that ‘special care is taken to ensure that the ordinary 
line of authority does not extend to [such facilities]’ (Goffman, 1961, p. 17). 
Nonetheless, this astute awareness of how institutions are becoming increasingly 
‘permeable’ (Goffman, 1961, p. 113) and how such permeability can have variable 
consequences for inmates and staff alike (and the population at large) brings his 
analysis close to the Foucauldian idea that everyone is captured in an institution 
while nonetheless retaining a plural understanding of the processes of capture. 
We may consider the totalizing institutions of control society in terms of the 
transformation of the diagrammatic feature of disciplinary institutions instilled 
with an awareness of the institutional permeability that comes from Goffman, 
minus his optimistic belief in relatively free non-rational logics of civil society but 
instead with a nuanced understanding of these disaggregated and increasingly 
technical forms of authority. The shift from the designation total to ‘totalizing’ 
indicates these dynamic institutional features.  
Adapting Deleuze’s succinct characterization of disciplinary instruction we 
might say that the linguistic form of control institutions is this: ‘you are still a child, 
you know’, ‘you are still a patient, you know’, ‘you are still a learner, you know’, 
‘you are still a consumer, you know’, etc. It is a striking feature of life within 
contemporary institutions of control that one is always, to some degree, a child, a 
school pupil, an apprentice, a university student, a worker, a consumer, a parent, 
a patient, a prisoner, a free person etc. but one is never merely one of these things 
at any one time (a disciplined subject of an institution). However, it is not enough 
to say that institutional life is controlled through the maintenance of all of these 
dividuated features, as this would imply that life in one totalizing institution would 
always be the same as life in another. In fact, it is important to note initially, before 
we can formalize this in the next section, that the dividuated components 
operative within institutional formations of control are always sequenced in 
particular ways (though changeable, conflictual and even contradictory). Exactly 
how these dividuated components are sequenced will not only vary between 
different totalizing institutions but within each institution depending on other 
factors at play in the everyday rough and tumble of institutional life.  
  These latter features of totalizing institutions can be elaborated via 
Goffman’s own theoretical framing of the dramatic qualities of everyday life. In 
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Goffman (1990) accounts for the 
theatrical elements of face-to-face interactions. In such interactions, individuals 
act in specific ways in specific settings, in much the same way that actors perform 
a role on the stage. Drawing out this comparison, he claims, enables the sociologist 
to focus on the way individuals present themselves to each other, the scene in 
which such presentations occur and the dynamics of interaction conditioned by 
both role and setting. While malleable in everyday life, these roles and settings are 
relatively fixed by total institutions, a process he refers to as ‘mortification’ – the 
everyday ability to own a role, present oneself in a certain way, is replaced by ‘role 
dispossession’ (Goffman, 1961, p. 24). The inmate, for example, ‘finds certain roles 
are lost to him by virtue of the barrier that separates him from the outside world’ 
and it is intriguing that he considers the entrance into total institutions as a form 
of ‘coding’, where the individual is ‘coded into an object that can be fed into the 
administrative machinery of the establishment, to be worked on smoothly by 
routine operations’ (Goffman, 1961, p. 26). For all that this prefigures the 
technological dimension of control outlined by Deleuze, there is still, in Goffman, 
a sense that ‘civil life, the sequential scheduling of the individual’s roles, both in 
the life cycle and in the repeated daily round, ensures that no one role he plays 
will block his performance and ties in another’ (Goffman, 1961, p. 24). Ultimately, 
indeed, Goffman’s understanding of the theatrical implies not only a sense of 
normal role functioning but also a backstage; that area where we can let our social 
roles slip and simply ‘be ourselves’. But if, following Foucault and Deleuze, there 
is no such civil life that stands in contrast to institutional life nor a backstage that 
serves as a normative benchmark for analyses then, in fact, we are having to 
occupy several stages all at once, perform several roles all at once, construct 
several scenes all at once, in all aspects of our lives, with no backstage as a site of 
retreat. This is the condition of life in totalizing institutions of control. It can be 
clarified once more with reference to disciplinary institutions. 
Where disciplinary institutions operate through the making of subjects, 
control societies totalize dividuals without the formation of a subjective centre. 
Every aspect of one’s life is put into continuous variation with every other such 
that we are always performing multiple roles at the same time. However, it is 
important to recall that we are not performing multiple selves, rather we are 
stretched across the institutional domain as dividuated actors who are nothing 
but the roles we play and we have to play all of these roles all the time in any given 
institutional setting, albeit in a particularly sequenced manner. Where Goffman 
(1990) thought we could switch roles in civil life with relative ease because we 
were able, in private life backstage, to let the mask slip, and Foucault (1977) 
thought that disciplinary roles were forged on docile bodies to turn them into 
subjects of the institution, in control societies there are roles without subjects 
backstage or on stage. Instead, there are only collections of roles (often 
experienced as contradictory or, at least, in tension) dispersed across the stage 
and across several stages all at once.  
Before moving on to the following section it is worth summarizing the 
claims so far. Deleuze’s ‘Postscript’ implicitly presents two versions of the 
emergence of societies of control; the first emphasizes the changing nature of 
institutional forms, the second emphasizes processes of de-institutionalization 
and increasing technological forms of governance. While the latter has been 
picked up more extensively in the literature, the changing nature of institutions 
has remained under theorized. Drawing together the dynamic and dramatic 
approach to total institutions developed by Goffman and the diagrammatic 
features of subject formation in Foucault’s account of disciplinary institutions 
enables a better understanding of what is at stake in the institutions of control 
society. In short, these institutions function by totalizing dividuated components 
of subjectivity in malleable sequences that are dispersed between and within 
these institutional forms.  
 
Critique in Control Societies 
What is the status of critique in control societies? The question is framed in this 
way because it is not clear what role, if any, critical theory, broadly understood, 
can play in control societies. It is a problem that Rouvroy has expressed very 
clearly (although she refers to the role of critique after the ‘computational turn’):  
I wonder if it is still possible to practice critical thinking after a 
computational turn, which despite its pretence to ‘objectivity’, appears 
as a turning point away from the ambitions of modern rationality 
anchored in empirical experiment and deductive – causal – logic and, 
despite its promises of personalization and better taking into 
consideration of individual merits, needs, abilities, preferences, does 
not address individuals through their reflexive capabilities or through 
their inscription within collective structures, but merely through their 
‘profiles’ (Rouvroy, 2012, p. 2).   
Moreover, she argues that there are three key features of life under the 
‘computational turn’ that make critique difficult to practice. First, the background 
of ‘real life’ (no matter how constructed we might think this is) is becoming 
‘indistinct’ (Rouvroy, 2012, p. 2). Secondly, the modern framework of judicial and 
scientific testing through experiment has been superseded by ‘the real time, pre-
emptive production of algorithmic reality’ (Rouvroy, 2012, p. 2). Thirdly, what she 
calls ‘algorithmic governmentality’ is a regulative form without subject, such that 
it does not allow for or enable the reflexivity necessary for critique (Rouvroy, 
2012, p. 2). This is a delimitation of the problem of critique today with which we 
broadly agree: it is no longer possible to rely upon the reflexive capacities of 
subjects, especially if these are deemed to be part of our innate cognitive 
apparatus, in order to ground critique in societies of control. We will, however, 
suggest a broader framing of this problem that in turn will slightly alter her 
account of the status of critique today: as we will argue below, we are less 
convinced than Rouvroy of the potential that remains within transgressive forms 
of critique in a post-disciplinary context of control.  
From the perspective of current theoretical debates, we can see that it is 
indeed the case that there is an increasing consensus that the age of critique has 
come to an end. Certainly, it remains the case that the idea of critique as a practice 
of establishing the limits of legitimate forms of knowledge available to a reflexive 
subject that emerged within sovereign societies is still an important strand of 
those inheritors of Kant committed to the communicative turn (notably, second 
generation Critical Theory, hermeneutics and varieties of second wave feminism). 
Moreover, for those suspicious of the exclusionary and disciplinary consequences 
of such critical practices, it became important to reframe the idea of critique as a 
practice that transgresses those subjective limits by exposing their historical and 
cultural contingency (notably, third-wave feminism, post-Marxism and 
poststructuralism). Critique as a practice of stepping beyond the limits of possible 
knowledge, for some, came to replace the idea that critique should establish the 
limits of legitimate knowledge. To the extent that we still see the pernicious effects 
of disciplinary institutions the world over, such practices of transgressive critique 
still hold sway.  However, if it is the case that we increasingly live under regimes 
of ‘algorithmic governmentality’ or, what we would call, an emergent post-
disciplinary society of control then it is by no means clear what, if any, new 
practice of critique is appropriate for this emerging new epoch. In the face of this 
uncertainty, it is perhaps not surprising to note that the apparently radical 
cutting-edge of contemporary philosophical inquiry has sought to leave behind 
the idea of philosophical and practical critique altogether. It has become 
increasingly commonplace to argue that critique is either exhausted such that it 
should be replaced by a deeper appreciation of matters of concern (Latour, 2004; 
Harman, 2011) or, that the tendency of parliamentary-capitalism to recuperate 
critical positions means that it should be replaced by a revitalized politics of 
commitment (Badiou and Žižek, 2009). However, in line with Rouvroy, we take it 
that the status of critique in control societies can be positively reframed and that 
it is necessary to do so if we are to ward off the dangers of a conservative embrace 
of that which simply concerns us most, or a dogmatic position of commitment in 
the name of a subject of truth that can simply break open and away from the 
democratic marshalling of fixed and unchallenged opinions. In this sense, we claim 
that critique has a history. Not just that it must mobilize historical material to 
ward off a-historical tendencies, in the manner of historical materialism or 
genealogy for example, but that the very idea and practice of critique must adapt 
as social formations evolve and change. But what remains of critique if there is no 
recourse to the reflexive subject, its communicative variant or the transgression 
of limits set by both?  
Rouvroy presents a compelling answer: ‘what has to be preserved as 
antecedent to both the subject and sociality, as excess of the world over 
algorithmic reality, is “the common”, the “in-between”, this space of common 
appearance in which we are mutually addressed to each other’ (Rouvroy, 2012, p. 
13). It is a space that she argues can be constructed in many different ‘heterotopic 
spatio-temporal spaces interrupting digital and capitalist flows – such as the 
judicial, theatrical, literary, laboratory scenes’ (Rouvroy, 2012, p. 14). It is notable, 
though, that she argues for a particular role of the judicial in this regard. She claims 
that law retains the possibility for constructing legal personalities which can 
express ‘individual or collective agencies or potencies’ such that norms can be 
made explicit and contestable by newly constituted subjects-in-common that can 
give ‘an account of themselves’ against the neutralizing tendencies of algorithmic 
governmentality (Rouvroy, 2012, p. 15). Indeed, there is an echo of Rouvroy’s 
appeal to critique as the judicial practice of giving voice to ‘the common’ in the 
work of Raunig (2016); another penetrating critic of control society. For Raunig, 
‘law is not necessarily always only a preserving power, handmaid of a force long 
since constituted, tool of established institutions’ it can become, in its 
jurisprudential form, a means by which we can achieve a ‘new actuality with each 
new judgement’ (Raunig, 2016, p. 171). He goes so far as to name this form of law, 
‘dividual law’; a form of judicial practice that is ‘not based on individuals and their 
property but rather on the singularity of manifold ecologies beyond property and 
individualization’ (Raunig, 2016, p. 175).  
Compelling as both these attempts at the judicial reframing of the idea of 
critique may be, they nonetheless tend toward an idea of critique that is unlikely 
to have real critical purchase because they remain committed to the link between 
critique and (judicial) limitation, even in the name of its transgression. This is the 
case because neither goes far enough with either the potential grounds of a 
critique of algorithmic governmentality or with their analyses of how the 
institutions of control society function. While we have gone some way towards the 
latter dimension in the previous section, in the remainder of this section we will 
clarify what we mean by the grounds of a critique of control in such a way that it 
will enable us to formalize the nature of the totalization of dividuals that defines 
institutions of control. Once clarified we can then summarize the task of critique 
in control societies such that we will offer, in the concluding section, certain 
tentative criteria for assessing whether or not practices of resistance may, to some 
extent at least, be adequately formulated to unravel ‘the snakes’ coils’. 
Two questions are useful in setting out the task of critique in contemporary 
societies of control: what is an algorithm? And how do totalizing institutions 
sustain algorithmic functioning? Considering the first, an algorithm is a self-
contained step-by-step set of operations to be performed. There are three key 
elements to this definition that are important for our discussion. First, while a 
human may perform the algorithmic task, increasingly it is a task that is 
outsourced to computers. Rouvroy puts it succinctly when she says that 
algorithmically produced knowledge is no longer produced by humans about the 
world, rather it is ‘produced from the digital world’ (Rouvroy, 2012, p. 4). 
Secondly, an algorithm is a process, but importantly it is a finite and contained 
process. In this sense, it is correct to talk of algorithms as ‘IF…THEN…functions’, 
where IF specifies the conditions of the operations and THEN specifies the 
consequences of the operation. Thirdly, that which is operated upon can be 
referred to as data, information, code and so on but we follow Lazzarato’s (2014) 
treatment of these as signs. The sign can in principle take any ‘computable’ form: 
it may be a number, but it could just as legitimately be a visual symbol, a bodily 
gesture, a click on a keyboard, a smell; even a user’s attentiveness or not to parts 
of a screen (Bueno, 2017). In sum, therefore, our initial definition of an algorithm 
can be parsed as follows: an algorithm is a finite process of establishing 
consequences from conditions by virtue of operations that act upon signs. When 
understood in this way, it is clear that algorithmic realities present a fundamental 
challenge to the idea of critique. 
What these clarifications also highlight, however, is a prima facie case to 
turn to a process philosophy of signs in order to interrogate what is required of a 
critique of control societies, at the level of the algorithm. If we understand 
algorithms as fixed and limited processes then it makes sense to approach the 
critique of how they operate from within the conditions of their own production; 
that is, as processes that operate upon signs. Williams (2016) has outlined just 
such a process philosophy, albeit with different intent. In this work, Williams has 
constructed what he describes as an ‘ontologically modest’ process philosophy, 
one that does not look to establish the metaphysical status of processes but rather 
employs process philosophy in the service of a critical engagement with the world 
of signs. That said, it is, in our view, precisely this ontological modesty that enables 
Williams to provide a formal and practically rigorous critique of the ways in which 
signs are manipulated in algorithms.  
According to Williams, the formal qualities of the sign are threefold: a) 
every sign is a selected set (Williams, 2016, p. 6); b) each set has at least one 
diagram that expresses the relations in and around the set (Williams, 2016, p. 6); 
c) each set is ‘open to many diagrams that are not unique’ such that each sign is 
open to revaluation (Williams, 2016, p. 7). While Williams then embarks upon a 
series of debates about the nature of the sign that range across biology and 
semiology, amongst other domains, we see the means whereby we can construct 
an approach to critique appropriate to the current dominant use of algorithms in 
social, economic and political life. As signs are manipulated through IF…THEN… 
functions so the set of the sign is fixed according to one diagram in order for it to 
serve as both condition and, in the case of another sign, consequence, with no 
consideration therefore to its possible revaluation. In simple terms, the algorithm 
fixes meaning but process philosophy establishes that every sign is in principle 
connected to every other sign such that one can always find a meaningful point 
from which to critique the algorithmic function itself. Processes even when 
considered in an ontologically modest fashion, are more fundamental than 
algorithms and, in that sense, will always exceed the algorithmic function because 
the processual connections between the component parts of the sign are in 
principle infinite. As Williams puts it: ‘the process sign allows for layers of process 
by including signs within others…The main threat to this process definition comes 
from boundaries imposed on the sign as process, where the sign is given as static 
or limited’ (Williams, 2016, p. 11). Algorithms, for all of their apparent fluidity and 
flow, are ultimately limited to the extent that they must presume particular 
significations within the sign in order for the bounded function to operate. The 
excess of potential expressed by a fully-fledged process philosophy of the sign, 
therefore, provides the immanent ground of a critique of algorithmic 
governmentality; immanent because it is internal to the logic that sustains the 
algorithm itself. In the terms that we prefer, process philosophy offers an 
immanent critique of the technological operators that modulate codes of control. 
While it is the processual nature of signs that enables algorithms to function, it is 
also this nature that enables their critique: ‘as critical and creative, signs take on 
a function of alarm and innovation in conjunction with other claims to knowledge 
and to truth’ (Williams, 2016, p. 172). 
In itself, though, this processual critique of the algorithm is not enough to 
unravel control. In this respect, we agree broadly with Neyland and Möllers 
(2017) who challenge the idea that algorithms have an intrinsic power and agency 
such that their critique would be sufficient to challenge that power. Indeed, a 
similar point is made by Bueno in his work on the attention economy: ‘a critique 
of the attention economy cannot remain at the level of the examination of the 
cybernetic machines that transform the productive process…but must move 
towards the analysis of the power diagram that produces and makes use of these 
new technologies’ (Bueno, 2017, p. 135). What is needed, according to Neyland 
and Möllers (2017), is an appreciation of the ‘situated character’ of algorithmic 
systems; according to Bueno, a critique of the machinic dimension of cognitive 
capitalism must be matched with a critique of social subjection contained within 
the ‘power diagram’ with which the machinic is in a relationship of mutual 
imbrication; and, according to Williams (2016), we should focus on the 
diagrammatic relations of intensity that can be revaluated and contested in the 
political sign.  
We are proposing that the ‘totalizing institution’ is the diagram (in 
Foucault’s sense) of the institutional form that distributes dividuals in particular 
but malleable sequences that must be exposed and critiqued every bit as much as 
the functions of ‘algorithmic governmentality’ if we are to enact an immanent 
critique of societies of control. The key to understanding this institutional 
component of the critique of control societies resides in what we have called the 
sequential ordering of the dividuals of totalizing institutions: this means that the 
dominant aspect of the dividuated subject organizes the diagram of its role as a 
sign but this sign, in control societies, does not exclude but rather includes other 
elements in particular ways. The role of totalizing institutions, therefore, is to 
sustain particular distributions, particular and changeable diagrams, of these 
sequenced modulations in line with algorithmic functioning. They do this by 
sequencing dividuations in the first instance but also by retaining a certain, 
apparently open-ended but actually limited (hence totalizing but never total), 
series of components which then enables the functioning of the algorithms across 
different modulations of totalizing institutions. 
While these algorithmic functions are now well known, and can be 
critiqued at the level of the potentially infinite process of signification they 
constrain, they can also be critiqued through a process we would call counter-
sequencing. Counter-sequencing is the activity of reordering the power diagram of 
the totalizing institution in ways that destabilize its functioning. That said, it 
would be unwise to assume in advance that counter-sequencing must result in 
some kind of ‘positive’ ethico-political outcome. The aim, instead, is to understand 
the critical potential of counter-sequencing first and then to engage in, what 
Williams calls, the revaluation of that critique with more ‘local’, that is ‘pragmatic’, 
concerns at the forefront of such revaluations. At which point, the grounds of 
critique become the very stuff of the politics of totalizing institutions.  Moreover, 
to the extent that the critique of totalizing institutions can be understood in this 
way we would claim that Rouvroy’s (2012) and (less-so) Raunig’s (2016) 
tendency toward a hopeful redeployment of the jurisprudential domain in the 
name of ‘the in-between’ or ‘the common’ is a matter of political dispute rather 
than the grounds for a critique of algorithmic governmentality or societies of 
control per se. 
 
Conclusion: On Resistance 
Having clarified what we understand as the grounds of critique in control 
societies, are we any nearer to the political task of deciding between alternative 
forms of resistance in order to unravel the snake’s coils? If there is merit in our 
presentation of the totalizing institution as a key feature of the operation of 
control then the criteria for practices that resist control are to be found in both the 
process-oriented critique of the algorithm and the counter-sequencing of 
dividuals within institutions as part of the same practice.  
The risk of recuperation within systems and institutions of control is ever-
present if the focus is only on one side or the other of the technological and 
institutional domains. A focus on the process-oriented critique of algorithms alone 
may tend toward the valorization of certain networked practices that ultimately 
play into the hands of algorithmic forms of governmentality. At its most superficial 
level, this is clear in Facebook activism that feeds the very algorithms that one may 
be aiming to resist: angry people click and clicks feed the algorithms. At a more 
subterranean level, practices of hacking directly into the systems that produce the 
algorithms may offer more critical potential, although this remains contested. As 
Wark, author of the hugely influential A Hacker’s Manifesto (2004) has noted, 
hackers ‘won the battle but lost the war’ to the extent that ‘the vectoral class’ still 
owns the metadata and has ‘regrouped around a more abstracted form of control’ 
(Gregg and Wark, 2013, no pg). 
Similar dilemmas of recuperation abound on the institutional side of the 
problem. For example, for all of Raunig’s sensitivities to the idea that we should 
not presume that there are new forms of revolutionary subjectivity simply waiting 
in the historical wings, there is still a tendency toward a necessitarian reading of 
certain political struggles. He says: ‘the current fields of struggle necessarily 
develop from the lines of flight of indigenous, ecological and feminist struggles; 
monopolist land ownership, extractivism, strategies of displacement and the 
renewed colonization of im/material commons for constituting new modes of 
subjectivity that no longer take recourse to the primacy of the individual’ (Raunig, 
2016, p. 180). While we certainly agree that such struggles offer many insights 
into contemporary strategies of resistance, we are more cautious about the idea 
that they ‘necessarily’ proffer forms of resistance that take flight from control.  
Given this caution, we would we agree with Wark to the extent that, while he 
refuses to praise or blame such horizontalist popular movements, he does 
recognize that a sole focus on their resistant potential tends toward traditional 
forms of ‘calling to account’ that are easily recuperated within institutional 
mechanisms of control. The conclusion he and Gregg draw from this is that we 
must learn how to enact our own forms of (individual and collective) ‘life-hack’. 
He says; ‘what if we didn’t teach everyone to code but taught everyone the logic 
that underlies all such digital systems and gave everyone access to knowledge 
about how hardware and infrastructure really work? And in a way that is both 
abstract and practical, about systems and power, but also about how to “hack” your 
life? This is more promising’ (our emphasis, Gregg and Wark, 2013, no pg).1   
At the interface of the abstract and practical we find the means with which 
to challenge the snake’s coils, not by appeal to an ever more fluid algorithm of 
movement nor by appeal to a less coiled form of institutional existence, but 
through the counter-sequencing of the snake’s segmented movement itself. And it 
is at this interface that Deleuze’s philosophical approach to the emergence of a 
new institutional form, which we have called the totalizing institution, operates 
most effectively as a critique of control and a series of measures by which it may 
be resisted both at the level of its algorithmic constitution and at the level of our 
dividuated existence in totalizing institutions. 
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1 It is important to acknowledge here the quotidian and rather banal 
recuperation and domestication of the concept of ‘hacking’ in the last number of 
years in broader consumer culture. For instance, if you google ‘life hacking’ you 
are much more likely to be directed to the websites of commercial companies 
selling self-help and personal development strategies than to Wark’s A Hacker’s 
Manifesto. The irony of such recuperation would not be lost on a situationist like 
him. 
                                                        
